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Background: Tobacco use is a major cause of chronic disease, disability and death among military personnel and
veterans. However, civilian public health and tobacco control advocates have been relatively silent on the issue.
Research on the tobacco industry shows a long history of interference in military tobacco policy through
relationships with the United States (US) Congress. The military cannot autonomously implement tobacco control,
but is subject to Congressional oversight. Thus, the primary obstacles to effective tobacco control in the military are
Congressional political opposition and tobacco industry influence, and by extension, a lack of civilian awareness
and support in the policy arena.
Methods: As part of a larger project to explore the topic of civilian support for military tobacco control, we
analyzed data from focus groups with public health professionals to better understand their sense of agency and
authority in regards to military tobacco control. Researchers conducted 4 focus groups with a total of 36 public
health professionals at key conferences for those working in public health and tobacco control. Data were coded
and the research team developed an interpretive account that captured patterns and variations in the data.
Results: Public health and tobacco control participants shared a sense of futility regarding civilian efforts to engage
in military tobacco control. This stemmed from feeling ignorant of military culture and structure, identifying
powerful discourses that opposed tobacco control, particularly in a military context, and the very-real presence of
the tobacco industry lobby throughout the policy process.
Conclusions: A strong public health voice on military tobacco control might serve to begin problematizing the
tobacco industry’s influence in the military policy arena. As the military moves to institute stronger tobacco control
policy, public health and tobacco control professionals should work to engage with and aid its efforts from the
outside. Only with such civilian side support can the goal of a tobacco free military be realized.
Keywords: Tobacco control, Military, Public health, Policy, CivilianBackground
In 2009, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) called for phas-
ing in a tobacco-free military [1,2]. This year, to mark
the 50th anniversary of the Surgeon General’s report on
smoking, the Under Secretary of Defense for Health Af-
fairs released a memorandum in March 2014 calling for
active engagement on the issue of military tobacco use,
and prompting a review of tobacco policy in the Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) [1,2]. Citing negative impacts on
military readiness, harms to individual performance, and
premature death for half of all regular users, the Under* Correspondence: quinn.grundy@ucsf.edu
Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of California, San
Francisco, 3333 California St, San Francisco, CA 94118, USA
© 2014 Grundy et al.; licensee BioMed Central
Commons Attribution License (http://creativec
reproduction in any medium, provided the or
Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.or
unless otherwise stated.Secretary specifically called for organization-wide struc-
tural reforms related to the sale of tobacco and tobacco
use on military installations. Despite state of the art to-
bacco cessation programs and the successful implemen-
tation of smoke free policies such as those implemented
in 2010 in the submarine fleet [3,4], military personnel
continue to have significantly higher rates of tobacco use
than civilians [5]. Exceeding the civilian estimate of 20.6%,
nearly one quarter of military personnel reported using
cigarettes in the past 30 days (24.5%), though this esti-
mate ranged by service from 17.2% in the Air Force to
31.9% in the Marine Corps [6]. Consequently, tobacco
use is a major cause of chronic disease, disability and
death, accounting for about one sixth of all deaths among. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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Afghanistan were associated with an increase in tobacco
use; smoking prevalence is over 50% higher in military
personnel who have been deployed than among those
who have not [2].
However, until recently, civilian public health and to-
bacco control advocates have been relatively silent on
the issue. In interviews, public health and tobacco con-
trol organization leaders revealed a lack of knowledge
about military tobacco use and its impact on the mili-
tary’s mission, and a belief in the “right” to use tobacco
[7]. Civilian public health organization leaders also held
mistaken beliefs about military policy development and
implementation [7], failing to recognize that military cul-
ture is shaped by a strict chain of command [8]. Instead,
they extrapolated from the civilian policy process, fa-
voring a democratic, non-hierarchic approach to tobacco
control. They prioritized cessation efforts, education, and
raising tobacco prices, though none recognized that the
latter would require congressional approval [7]. Focus
groups with civilian public health and tobacco control
professionals revealed that, like their organizations’ lea-
ders, the members regarded tobacco use as integral to
military culture, and tobacco control as a low priority
for military engaged in combat [9]. Both civilian public
health leaders and professionals expressed the opinion
that civilian advocates could have little impact on mili-
tary tobacco control policy [7,9].
Further, within the military, interviewees and focus
group participants (including enlisted personnel and their
supervisors, installation tobacco control managers, and
policy leaders) perceived tobacco use to be an accepted
part of military culture, justified by its purported stress-
relieving properties [10-12]. Despite evidence suggesting
that military personnel across all 4 services who reported
using tobacco also reported significantly higher stress
levels [13], service-level policy leaders and installation-
level tobacco control managers identified tobacco control
as a low priority for their leadership and noted environ-
mental factors that promoted tobacco use including the
low cost and easy accessibility of tobacco, tolerance of
smoke breaks, uneven enforcement of tobacco control
policy, especially during deployment, and the prevalence
of smoking areas [11,12]. Military leaders involved in the
recent successful banning of smoking aboard submarines
identified key factors contributing to this success includ-
ing strong empirical support, effective framing of the pol-
icy as upholding non-smokers’ rights, and the directive
stemming from the highest ranks of the organization [4].
However, the military cannot autonomously implement
tobacco control policies; the DoD is subject to Congres-
sional oversight. When the Secretary of the Navy recently
proposed ending the sale of tobacco in military stores,
members of Congress quickly mobilized to oppose theplan [14-16]. Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC) and 17 other
members of congress (16 Republicans and 1 Democrat,
largely from tobacco-producing states) wrote a letter to
Secretary Mabus urging him to abandon his proposed
Navy tobacco policy review [16]. Rep. Duncan Hunter
(R-CA), a member of the House Armed Services Com-
mittee, disputed that tobacco use harmed troop readiness,
and introduced an amendment to the 2015 National
Defense Authorization Act, requiring the continued sale
of any product currently in inventory in military exchan-
ges or commissaries [17]; the committee approved the
amendment and the legislation passed in the House in a
largely bipartisan vote (300-119) on December 4, 2014.
Following weeks of talks between the House and the
Senate Armed Services Committees, lawmakers expect
the legislation to pass the Senate by mid December
2014 [18]. Thus, Congress now requires the military to
sell tobacco in exchanges and commissaries.
Researchers have documented a long history of inter-
ference on the part of the tobacco industry in military
and Veterans’ Administration (VA) tobacco control pol-
icy [2,19,20]. Since 1985, the military has attempted to
lower military smoking rates to be at least on par with
civilian rates through multiple tobacco control measures,
however, these efforts have been repeatedly weakened
or rescinded altogether [20]. The tobacco industry has
methodically countered each initiative, sometimes wor-
king in concert with civilian union leaders and military
insiders to urge Congressional representatives to block
or weaken proposed measures [20]. For example, at-
tempts to increase cigarette prices at military stores
were thwarted by tobacco industry interference in poli-
cymaking through exploitation of complex relationships
among the DoD, Congress, commissaries and exchan-
ges, mobilizing alliances with the House Armed Servi-
ces and Morale Welfare and Recreation Committees,
framing price raises as an “erosion of benefits”, and ex-
posing internal DoD conflict over commissary pricing
policy [19]. These findings suggest that the primary ob-
stacles to effective tobacco control in the military are
political opposition and tobacco industry influence, and
by extension, a lack of civilian awareness and support
in the policy arena [3].
If military leaders are to explore the possibility of a
tobacco-free military, they will require the support and ex-
pertise of civilian public health and tobacco control com-
munities. Thus, the research question guiding this project
was: What are the perceptions of civilian public health
and tobacco control advocates and professionals regarding
military tobacco control? As part of a larger project to ex-
plore the topic of civilian support for military tobacco
control, we conducted focus groups with public health
professionals to better understand their sense of agency
and authority in regards to military tobacco control.
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Hispanic 0 0 0 1 1
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Design and sampling
Researchers conducted 4 focus groups with a total of
36 public health professionals at key conferences for
those working in public health and tobacco control: 2
in November 2010 at the American Public Health Asso-
ciation national meeting in Denver, CO [D1 and D2];
and 2 in August 2012 at the National Conference on
Tobacco or Health in Kansas City, MO [KC1 and KC2].
Focus groups are moderated group interviews useful
for exploring variability in poorly understood phenom-
ena [21,22]. A convenience sample of participants was
recruited through announcements from the conference
organizers and flyers in registration areas. Focus groups
were conducted on site in the conference facilities.
Inclusion criteria were attendance at the conference,
English speaking, and age ≥ 18 years. Participants were
paid $40. The researchers obtained ethical approval for
the study from the university’s Committee on Human
Research (CHR 10-01001).
Procedures
Two researchers, trained in facilitating focus groups,
used a standardized protocol with a low moderator in-
volvement approach, which allowed for the spontaneous
emergence of unanticipated information [22]. The co-
moderators, prior to commencement of the focus group,
obtained informed consent individually. Participants con-
sented to audiotaping; identifying information was deleted
in transcripts and participants identified by pseudonym.
The co-moderators took field notes and prepared debrief-
ing memos following each group. Participants completed
a brief demographic questionnaire (Table 1). Following
this, participants were asked to discuss their perceptions
of military tobacco use, military tobacco control, and
what, if any, role civilian public health advocates and
professionals might play in the development of military
tobacco control policy.
Data analysis
The researchers coded verbatim transcripts into thema-
tic categories. All three authors reviewed the transcripts
and together generated a set of preliminary codes. QG
and ES then coded all transcripts separately to identify
additional codes and through discussion, refined existing
codes. QG and ES then prepared a coding manual, in-
cluding working definitions of the codes. QG and ES
each re-coded all transcripts using the coding manual
and reached consensus regarding ambiguities in coding
through discussion. NVivo software [23] was utilized to
manage textual data. By iteratively reviewing data under
each code, the research team developed an interpretive
account that captured patterns and variations in the
data. The interpretive account was refined through writingmemos, which were developed with the research team.
This study adheres to the RATS guidelines of reporting
qualitative studies (http://biomedcentral.com/authors/rats).
Results
Thirty-six public health and tobacco control professionals
participated in the focus groups. Their demographic infor-
mation is summarized in Table 1.
“Throwing a rock at their armored tank”
Participants shared a sense that the military was im-
pervious to civilian engagement. Brittany [D1], a county
public health professional offered,
“My first thought is, is that even an option? I guess
what I know of the military makes me think that if it
doesn’t come from within the military, that it will not
happen. . . it would just be like throwing a rock at
their armored tank”.
Many, “intimidated” by the “daunting” task, character-
izing it as “an uphill battle”, anticipated that any civilian-
initiated efforts in the area of military tobacco control
would be met with great resistance on part of military
personnel. Andrew [D2], a tobacco control professional
believed “there’d be a lot of pushback from the military
to have civilian involvement in their policy”. Ashley [D1]
concluded, “I don’t know if it could be a civilian problem.
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They attributed this resistance to civilians’ lack of
knowledge and understanding about military life and
norms. Elizabeth [KC1], thwarted in her cessation pro-
gram efforts on a military base, recounted, “the response
I got back is, ‘but you don’t know what it’s like to be in
the field’”. Patty [KC2], a civilian employee of the mili-
tary, reinforced Elizabeth’s sense of rejection, explaining,
“The issue I see happening is when civilian people try to
come into military world, I’m going to tell you, ‘You have
no idea’”. Military culture was characterized as being
‘closed’ to civilian outsiders and participants identified
both physical and cultural barriers. Elizabeth [KC1] poin-
ted out, “you can’t just walk onto a base anyway” but that
also “the time it takes to learn even the military structure
and to be accepted and trusted by them and vice versa of
the civilians coming in” would be a “huge effort”.
A few participants, however, felt this was insufficient
justification for civilian public health’s lack of engagement.
Susan [D1], who worked with active duty personnel, ac-
knowledged that public health was “kind of scared of the
military”, and suggested that they should be “getting past
that, and, like, learning about that culture, just like we
would learn about any other culture”. Using desegregation
as a precedent, Beckie [D2] argued
“it’s not valid to just say that because they would be
resistant means it should continue because it clearly
shouldn’t and it clearly doesn’t, or at least we make
progress whenever someone outside the military
brings attention to an issue that’s wrong. . . There are
too many instances where they’ve had to accept
something that was different than what they were
doing before and they just got on with it and
moved on.”
Acknowledging the existing health disparities, Ashley
[D1] agreed: “Just because it’s hard to get to doesn’t
mean that we should forget about it. I absolutely think
there’s a problem that needs to be addressed, whether
we’re the biggest part of it or the military is”.
Public health in “partnership”
Others, however, continued to assert civilians’ lack of
authority. They characterized the military as an institu-
tion that “takes care of [its] own” and that typically, “they
deal with [problems] within”, which contributed to the
perception that involvement of civilians in military policy
was not only atypical, but discouraged. Stephanie [KC1]
thus explained that efforts toward military tobacco control
had to “come from within the military but with the part-
nership of public health. It can’t be just public health driv-
ing this all the way to the top”. Many suggested that therole of public health would be to “partner with [the mili-
tary]”. Ryan [KC2] suggested a cautiously optimistic ap-
proach: “I think we have the power to invite, to build
those relationships, those partnerships, to start the discus-
sion. It may not go anywhere”. The primary role of public
health within these partnerships was “to be really good ed-
ucators” about the issue of military tobacco use and to
bring expertise from programming with other popula-
tions. Erin [KC2] explained, “I always try very hard not to
“should” on anybody. So I would, I would not see my role
as imposing anything on anyone, whether they’re civilian
or active military . . . so I just see myself as a helper, not a
policy imposer”. Reinforcing the feeling that military to-
bacco control was beyond the scope of civilian public
health, Stephanie [KC1] observed, “there’s so few that are
in public health that . . . are veterans that work on this or
have family members that are connected to the military at
all or even consider the military a part of the population”.
One conceivable way of gaining access to military culture
was through military families. Participants believed mi-
litary families were directly and negatively impacted by
military tobacco use (in terms of both the health and eco-
nomic impacts) and saw these families as a feasible point
of access to military culture. Barbara [D1], emphasizing
the shared civilian status, suggested that public health
“make it, you know, more of like a family thing, when they
come home, they’re supporting them not to smoke, you
know. Because they’re [not] in the military. We’re not
either. You know. We’re kind of working together as a
team”.
We’re the tax payers
An alternate construction of civilian authority, however,
was as “tax payers”. Depicting a democratic hierarchy,
ending in the “tax payer”, Edward [D1], a former colonel
in a Medical Service Corps, pointed out that, “The Joint
Chiefs of Staff take their orders from a Commander in
Chief who, eventually, when you look around, we’re the
taxpayers. And we, the civilians, say [what] the military
will do or not do”. Civilians’ authority rested on the as-
sertion that as taxpayers, they funded the military, and
thus should have a say in its operations. The construc-
tion of the taxpayer resonated among participants across
groups, evoking concern over the “long-term healthcare
cost[s]” for veterans with tobacco-related disease that
they perceived to be ultimately shouldered by taxpayers.
One participant posed the rhetorical question, signifying
this particular logic, “why should I have to pay higher
military fees so that the people working there can engage
in self-destructive behavior?” They felt that framing the
issue of military tobacco control as being cost-effective
could motivate civilian groups to engage. However, al-
though they felt that framing military tobacco control in
this way could gain traction, they identified no specific
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Policy-level efforts
A minority perspective that arose was the characte-
rization of the military as an institution embedded in
a democratic society and thus, theoretically governed
by citizens. Bill [KC2], a retired Air Force member
explained,
“And also, who runs the military? You do. Not
military. That’s why we have a civilian President, a
civilian Secretary of Defense . . . Military members
happen to have decided to defend the country based
on what you want us to do”.
Certain participants wondered if civilians could be more
effective at the policy level. Referencing policy directives
like the repealing of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, participants
posited, “In the military, once an order is given, it has to
be obeyed” [D1]. Beckie [D2] thought:
“There are civilian people who are chiming in on
[Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell] and I think that they’re
helping to clarify the issues. And then it’s the military
people who either have to get on board or not. And
the ones who are getting on board are lending
credibility to the idea and momentum to the idea that
we have to get rid of this policy. But in the end it’s
really Congress who’s going to make a decision. And
then that’ll be that, you know? There won’t be two
ways about it”.
Others disagreed, feeling that Congress was not a fea-
sible target for civilian public health. Participants refer-
enced Congress’s inability to work in a bipartisan manner,
the tobacco lobby, and institutional inertia, which served
to reinforce the status quo. Noting that tobacco control
was a low priority issue for government compared with
the economy, for example, they suggested that it would be
“political suicide” and that elected officials “wouldn’t want
to touch” tobacco control in a military context. Beckie
[D2] explained, “I think you definitely don’t want to be
caught telling the military what to do, you know? It’s
unpatriotic”. Participants reinforced that military to-
bacco control was beyond their influence by underscor-
ing policy-level challenges in civilian tobacco control:
“we, as civilians, can’t even get our FDA to say that this
product, which is costing so much in healthcare, and
illness and death, is an illegal product. We can’t move
that”. Consequently, many participants conceded that
any policy-level efforts should be “incremental,” based
on “what they’re already doing, and that’s prevention,
education, outreach, treatment”.Competing with the tobacco industry
In two of the focus groups, there was extensive discussion
about the relationship between government and the to-
bacco industry and these relationships were perceived to
have greatly affected the ability of the public health com-
munity to influence government on this matter. There
was an overall perception that public health professionals
could not compete with the resources of the tobacco in-
dustry in lobbying for military tobacco control. Ashley
[D1], expressing her sense of futility explained,
“The members [of Congress] who come forward to try
to kill [smoke free policies] are the people that have
received funding from their campaigns from tobacco
industry . . .I don’t know if that would ever work,
because they get millions of dollars [in campaign
contributions] from them. And we can’t compete with
millions of dollars. We don’t have millions of dollars”.
Participants perceived that these relationships perme-
ated Congress, the Department of Defense and the Execu-
tive Branch. They also understood that these donations
constituted relationships that existed over time and that
they would not be jeopardized for issues like military to-
bacco control. Thomas [D1], echoing Ashley’s characteri-
zation of the situation, explained,
“And like she said, the Department of Defense, they
have a close relationship with the tobacco companies,
so it’s not going to be good for them to go against
their relationship, try to end their relationship if that’s
who’ve been funding you a lot of times over the
years”.
In contrast to the longevity of government-industry re-
lationships and the enthusiasm with which the industry
pursued and maintained them, John [D2] noted public
health’s relative lack of presence in the lobbying arena on
the issue of military tobacco control. He remarked that al-
though civilian tobacco control issues were often advo-
cated, on the issue of military tobacco control he did not
know of “any concerted advocacy effort that’s been made,
you know? If that effort were made to Congress or the
particular committees that have oversight responsibilities,
maybe there would be a response. I don’t know”. That
said, the belief prevailed that “tobacco companies are al-
ways going to be the top funder. And the top funder is al-
ways going to be the top policy maker in the policies for
tobacco use”, suggesting that policy-level efforts would be
overshadowed by the industry lobby.
Discussion
Public health and tobacco control participants expressed
a sense of futility regarding civilian efforts to engage in
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norant of military culture and structure, identifying
powerful discourses that opposed tobacco control, par-
ticularly in a military context, and the very-real presence
of the tobacco industry lobby throughout the policy
process. However, participants also challenged this sense
of futility, asserting various constructions of civilian
agency in regards to military tobacco control policy.
Further, participants expressed the importance of ad-
dressing health disparities stemming from military to-
bacco use and a willingness to approach this issue,
despite gaps in knowledge and skills.
Focus group participants seemed to be somewhat bet-
ter informed about the nature of military policymaking
than their leadership [7]. Many drew from personal ex-
perience working in or with the military, or had friends
and family members who had served. Others drew from
current events such as the repealing of Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell, to infer that the most successful approach to mili-
tary tobacco control might be a top-down directive from
Congress. This suggests possible avenues for public health
leadership to establish contacts and collaboration. How-
ever, to date, military tobacco control has not appeared as
a public health or tobacco control advocacy priority.
Compounding participants’ insecurity about their role
in military health policy was the sense that these efforts
would not be welcomed by military personnel or by
wider society. They spoke to several discourses that have
been effectively furthered by the tobacco industry [24,25]
around military personnel’s “right” to use a legal product
and that impinging on tobacco use would be perceived as
“unpatriotic”.
One way to frame civilian involvement in military to-
bacco control that gained traction within the groups was
as “taxpayers”. Participants believed that framing military
tobacco control in terms of cost-effectiveness could suc-
cessfully mobilize civilian advocacy, a strategy that is
frequently used in public health. For example, APHA
recently released a youtube video to promote the value
of public health to society: framed in terms of “return
on investment”, the narrative equated “saving lives” with
“saving money” [26]. In practice, framing military tobacco
control solely in economic terms could be challenging,
positioning citizens as unwilling to provide for the needs
of service members. A recent speech by former Defense
Secretary Chuck Hagel, however, suggests a way to do
this, using the cost argument as a bridge to the value of
health for military members; Hagel referenced the eco-
nomic costs of military tobacco use, but continued, “Now,
the dollars are one thing, but the health of your people, I
don’t know if you put a price tag on that. So I think it does
need to be looked at and reviewed” [27].
A minority of participants suggested that policy solutions
were needed to address the existing health disparities. Theysuggested the military potential to lead on social justice is-
sues, as they had on desegregation. That said, a number of
participants suspected that the true “armored tank” was
not the resistance of military personnel, but the tobacco
industry’s lobbying efforts, including campaign contribu-
tions [28], front groups [25], and the continued promotion
of tobacco directly to military personnel [29]. None of the
participants identified any public health advocacy regard-
ing military tobacco control in a policy arena.
Recommendations
Although civilian public health and tobacco control pro-
fessionals expressed the importance of addressing mi-
litary tobacco use and the resulting health disparities,
significant knowledge gaps existed and participants lacked
specific frameworks for action. Civilian public health or-
ganizations could begin prioritizing efforts by releasing
policy statements regarding military tobacco control; de-
veloping sections dedicated to military health research
and advocacy; and publishing military health and policy
research. As part of efforts to bridge the gaps between ci-
vilian and military tobacco control communities, civilian
public health organizations might consider building stra-
tegic partnerships with military public health and veterans’
service organizations (VSOs). VSOs play important roles
in bringing military tobacco control issues to the public’s
attention and serve as an active military voice in public
policy debates. Despite historic ties to the tobacco indus-
try [25], VSOs have not always supported tobacco industry
positions on policy initiatives, and thus, if approached
effectively, might be a strong ally in supporting stronger
tobacco control policies in the military. Part of this ap-
proach should include understanding the messages tar-
geted at veterans and military personnel about tobacco
in order to effectively frame initiatives and messages to
counter tobacco promotion.
Noting that the military cannot autonomously enact
tobacco control policies, civilian public health organiza-
tions should target their efforts at Congress. Problem-
atizing the relationships between lawmakers and the
tobacco industry could involve publicizing campaign
contributions by the tobacco industry to members of
Congress [28], lobbying politicians to eliminate tobacco
industry contributions, and efforts to raise the status of
military tobacco control on the policy agenda through
media advocacy.
However, before undertaking this political work, it will
be important to develop more effective messaging around
the anachronous and inappropriate “right to smoke” dis-
course that remains an obstacle to the goal of a tobacco-
free military. In fact, (a) there is no recognized “right”
to smoke; (b) the military tells individuals what they
can and cannot do to all the time, including things that
have much less impact on their ability to perform (e.g.
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the military cannot restrict access to an addictive product
that damages military performance, increases military
costs, and endangers those around them is increasingly in-
appropriate given the state of the science on tobacco’s ac-
tual effects on the military mission.
Limitations
Focus group participants were a convenience sample,
drawn from the population of conference attendees at
two major public health and tobacco control confer-
ences. Thus, their perceptions and knowledge of military
tobacco control may not be representative of the views
of civilian public health and tobacco control professionals.
As this was not a purposive sample and no data were col-
lected about participants’ employment or field specialties,
it is unknown whether participants were particularly qua-
lified to comment on military tobacco control. However,
all participants identified as working in public health or
tobacco control and several reported current and/or for-
mer involvement with the military in some capacity.
Conclusions
Although perhaps more “daunting” than liaising with mili-
tary personnel, a strong public health voice on military to-
bacco control might serve to begin problematizing the
tobacco industry’s influence in the military policy arena.
As the military moves to institute stronger tobacco con-
trol policy, public health and tobacco control professionals
should work to engage with and aid its efforts from the
outside. Only with such civilian side support can the goal
of a tobacco free military be realized.
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